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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






JULIO CESAR GONZALES ZAMORA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
            Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A091-293-465) 
Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 21, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 







 Julio Cesar Gonzalez Zamora (“Gonzalez Zamora”) petitions for review of the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.1  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition for review. 
 Gonzalez Zamora, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States 
without inspection or parole in 1981, and adjusted his status in 1991.  He was convicted 
in 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas of 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(A), and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 70 months.  On or about October 7, 2013, Gonzalez Zamora was served 
with a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings.  Based on his admissions before an 
Immigration Judge, he was found to be removable under Immigration & Nationality Act 
(“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(43)(B) (illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, including a drug trafficking 
crime), and INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who has been 
convicted of a controlled substance offense. 
 After being advised that he was ineligible for most forms of relief from removal, 
Gonzalez Zamora applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, 
claiming a fear of being harmed in Mexico by his co-conspirators.  At his merits hearing 
in April, 2015, he testified that his sister-in-law, Magda, offered him $2,000 to participate 
in the drug trafficking scheme that ultimately led to his arrest and conviction.  He claimed 
that the leader of the scheme and other co-conspirators remained at-large in Mexico, and 
                                              
1 We will use the spelling of the surname provided in the Petitioner’s brief. 
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that they might seek revenge against him for losses sustained by the group on account of 
his arrest, or try to recruit him for further illicit activity if he returns.  He also claimed 
that Magda’s nephew was killed in Mexico in 2011 or 2012; that his childhood friend 
disappeared in Mexico; and that an unidentified acquaintance was forced to work for a 
drug cartel after the group mistreated members of his family.  He claimed further that his 
brother was severely beaten by one of these cartels, that they “they cut the head” of 
“another person that [he knew],” and that his sister-in-law “is on the list.” 
 The IJ denied the CAT application for insufficient evidence and ordered that 
Gonzalez Zamora be removed to Mexico.  The IJ noted that Gonzalez Zamora admitted 
that he has never been threatened with harm and that he has no fear that Mexican 
government officials will torture him.  The IJ acknowledged that Gonzalez Zamora may 
be legitimately concerned about the prospect of being recruited by criminal elements in 
Mexico, but that such a fear is insufficient to prove that it is more likely than not that he 
would be subjected to torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican 
government.   
 Gonzalez Zamora appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and submitted 
numerous letters from family members, including his children, expressing their need for 
him and supporting his efforts to remain in the United States.  On June 4, 2015, the Board 
affirmed the IJ and dismissed the appeal.  The Board noted as a threshold matter that, 
because his offense involved more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, Gonzalez Zamora was 
not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C.§1182(h), among 
other things not relevant here.  The Board then concluded that there was no record 
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evidence which would support a conclusion that there is a clear probability that Gonzalez 
Zamora will be tortured upon his return to Mexico. 
 Gonzalez Zamora has timely petitioned for review, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  The 
INA precludes review of final orders against aliens who, like Gonzalez Zamora, are 
removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony or an offense related to a 
controlled substance.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).2  We, nevertheless, retain jurisdiction 
over colorable constitutional claims and questions of law.  Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D).  A CAT 
applicant must show that “it is more likely than not that [he] would be tortured in the 
proposed country of removal.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010), holds that whether future torture is likely turned on two 
questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is 
likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?”  Id. at 271.  The first question 
is factual; the second is legal.  See id.  See also Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. of 
U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).  The agency denied Gonzalez Zamora’s 
CAT application on the basis that what is likely to happen to him in Mexico does not 
amount to the legal definition of torture.  This is a reviewable determination.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).  In addition, Gonzalez Zamora argues in his brief that he is statutorily 
eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), contrary to the agency’s 
determination that he is not.  Petitioner’s Brief, at 3.  
 We will deny the petition for review.  Where, as here, the Board agrees with the 
decision and analysis of the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.  
                                              
2 Gonzalez Zamora does not dispute that he is removable as charged. 
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See Sandie v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We conclude that 
the agency considered all of Gonzalez Zamora’s evidence, applied the correct standard of 
review, gave him a full and fair opportunity to present evidence, and properly determined 
that the record evidence does not meet the legal definition of torture.  “Torture is defined 
as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining ... information or a confession, 
punishing [him] ... for an act [he] has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
intimidating or coercing, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.”  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  The torture must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of” an official person.  Id.  The prospect of being recruited 
by criminal elements in Mexico does not meet the legal definition of torture.  Moreover, 
Gonzalez Zamora failed to show a link between the Mexican government and drug cartel 
recruitment and violence as it pertains to his application.  He provided corroborating 
country-conditions evidence—a 2013 State Department Human Rights Report—showing 
that cartel violence and official corruption remain serious problems in Mexico, but this 
evidence also indicates that the Mexican government is making efforts to combat both.  
In any event, there is an insufficient link between this country-conditions evidence and 
Gonzalez Zamora’s particular allegations.  Accordingly, the agency properly denied relief 
under the CAT. 
 Gonzalez Zamora argues in his brief that the aggravated felony bar to waivers 
under INA § 212(h) does not apply to him because he was not admitted as a lawful 
permanent resident; rather, he adjusted his status many years after he entered the United 
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States.  Petitioner’s Brief, at 3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (“The terms ‘admission’ 
and ‘admitted’ mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United 
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”)).  We have 
previously held that this is a valid distinction.  See Hanif v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 
479, 484 (3d Cir. 2012) (section 212(h) waiver limitation applies only where there is “a 
prior admission to the United States [and] that … prior admission has been made while 
the alien was in the status of a lawful permanent resident.”).  See also Martinez v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 693 F.3d 408, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2012).  More is required, however, to be 
eligible for a § 212(h) waiver on the basis of an “extreme hardship,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h)(1)(B), to a qualifying relative.  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, aliens may be 
inadmissible on criminal or related grounds, id. at § 1182(a)(2), but the statute provides 
the Attorney General the discretion to waive inadmissibility insofar as the criminal or 
related grounds “relate to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana,” id. at § 1182(h).  Gonzalez Zamora’s offense is a drug conspiracy involving 
possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine.  It thus does not 
relate “to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana” and so 
he is still ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
